Transfer Payment Systems and Financial Distress: Insights from Health Insurance Premium Subsidies

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract How should payment systems of means-tested benefits be designed to improve the financial situation needy recipients most effectively? We study this question in context mandatory health insurance Switzerland, where initially receive either a cash transfer or subsidized premiums (a form in-kind transfer). A federal reform 2014 forced cantons (i.e. states) universally switch provision. exploit setting based on difference-in-differences design, analyzing eight years rich individual-level accounting data and applying machine learning approach identify prior reform. find that switching from transfers persistently reduces likelihood late premium payments by about 20% government debt collection for long-term missed approximately 12%. There is no evidence negative spillover effect timely non-subsidized co-pay bills services after regime change.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1542-4766', '1542-4774']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvac011