Transducer-based analysis of cryptographic protocols

Transducer-based analysis of cryptographic protocols

Cryptographic protocols can be divided into (1) protocols where the protocol steps are simple from a computational point of view and can thus be modeled by simple means, for instance, by single rewrite rules—we call these protocols non-looping— and (2) protocols, such as group protocols, where the protocol steps are complex and typically involve an iterative or recursive computation—we call the...

INSTITUT FÜR INFORMATIK UND PRAKTISCHE MATHEMATIK Tree Transducer-based Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols

Automated Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols Using Mur'

A methodology is presented for using a general-purpose state enumeration tool, Mur', to analyze cryptographic and security-related protocols. We illustrate the feasibility of the approach by analyzing the Needham-Schroeder protocol, nding a known bug in a few seconds of computation time, and analyzing variants of Kerberos and the faulty TMN protocol used in another comparative study. The eecien...

On Symbolic Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols

The universally composable symbolic analysis (UCSA) framework layers Dolev-Yao style symbolic analysis on top of the universally composable (UC) secure framework to construct computationally sound proofs of cryptographic protocol security. The original proposal of the UCSA framework by Canetti and Herzog (2004) focused on protocols that only use public key encryption to achieve 2-party mutual a...

Automatic Analysis of Recursive Cryptographic Protocols

In recent years, formal methods have been developed to analyze and verify cryptographic protocols. We will focus on protocols that rely on iteration or recursion. These protocols typically use special security tokens – such as numbers used only once, called nonces, or keys generated by a principal – to achieve their security assertions. The recursion depth of the computations in such protocols ...