Transaction-specific investments and organizational choice: a Coase-to-Coase theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs
This paper, by introducing complexity considerations, provides a dynamic foundation for the Coase Theorem and highlights the role of transaction costs in generating inefficient outcomes in bargaining/negotiation. We show that, when the players have a preference for less complex strategies, the Coase Theorem is valid in negotiation models with repeated surplus and endogenous disagreement payoffs...
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This paper explores the extent to which ex ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify the basic hold-up problem that arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay ex ante costs for the negotiation to take place. We then show that a Coasian solution to this problem is not available: a Coasian solution typically entails a negotia...
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It has been long recognized that an exhaustible-resource monopsonist faces a commitment problem similar to that of a durable-good monopolist. Indeed, Hörner and Kamien (2004) demonstrate that the two problems are formally equivalent under full commitment. We show that there is no such equivalence in the absence of commitment. The existence of a choke price at which the monopsonist adopts the su...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Institutional Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1744-1374,1744-1382
DOI: 10.1017/s1744137414000435