Trading incentives to meet the analyst forecast
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Accounting Studies
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1380-6653,1573-7136
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-006-9017-9