منابع مشابه
/ 46 Bargaining and delay in trading networks
We study a model in which heterogenous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among the seller, the buyer and the intermediaries at equilibrium. We show that a trading network is pairwi...
متن کاملBargaining and Delay in Trading Networks †
We study a model in which heterogenous agents first form a trading network where link formation is costless. Then, a seller and a buyer are randomly selected among the agents to bargain through a chain of intermediaries. We determine both the trading path and the allocation of the surplus among the seller, the buyer and the intermediaries at equilibrium. We show that a trading network is pairwi...
متن کاملBargaining and Arbitrage in Endogenous Trading Networks∗
The paper proposes an intertemporal model of bargaining among heterogeneous buyers and sellers placed on an endogenous bipartite network. First, we characterize those networks whose trading restrictions are non-binding in that the induced outcome is “arbitrage-free,” i.e. all trade is conducted at the same price. Second, we assume that the network is endogenously determined, as captured by the ...
متن کاملThe effect of decision weights in bargaining problems
Bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from expected utility but can be modelled according to rank dependent utility theory. Under rank dependent utility both the utility function and the probability weighting function influence the risk attitude of a decision maker. The same definition of risk aversion leads to two forms of risk aversion: utility ris...
متن کاملMinisterial Weights and Government Formation: Estimation Using a Bargaining Model∗
This paper proposes a method to estimate relative ministerial weights in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, our method combines a bargaining model of government formation with maximum likelihood estimation. The data required for estimation are who formateurs are, what each party’s voting weight is, and what ministerial seats each party obtains. We use variation of the data and the structu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.10.003