منابع مشابه
Optimal Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information
When cost is private information in the Brander{Spencer model, the home government is confronted by a decision of choosing between two policy options: a menu of policies and a uniform policy. The former induces separation and so reveals the cost information to the foreign competitors. The latter helps the weak ̄rm by concealing the cost information. The main result from this study is that polic...
متن کاملStrategic Trade Policy under Isoelastic Demand and Asymmetric Production Costs
We demonstrate that whether a good of a rival firm is a strategic substitute or astrategic complement is endogenously determined when the market inverse demand is hyperbolic. The relative competitiveness, which is expressed by the ratio of firms’ marginal costs, is the key determinant. We derive optimal trade policies, which are dependant upon the firms’ form of strategic action. In particular,...
متن کاملVertical Control and Parallel Trade under Asymmetric Information
Parallel trade (PT) is a practice related to arbitrage opera‐ tions in international trade. We provide a rationale for PT as an opportunistic behaviour by an international whole‐ saler who is privately informed about market demands in two countries where a multinational firm operates. This alternative theory of PT contributes to an explanation of why PT has gained considerable importance in var...
متن کاملTrade and Information Policy
As society is transformed by the usc of new technologies, information policy issues cross traditional boundaries to be found in a wide range of decision-making arenas. The New World Information Order (NWIO) debate lies relatively quiescent in Unesco, but surfaces in international trade negotiations in response to the US push to get trade in services, or international information flows, included...
متن کاملA Supplier’s Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information
In the supply-chain literature, an increasing body of work studies how suppliers can use incentive schemes such as quantity discounts to influence buyers’ ordering behaviour, thus reducing the supplier’s (and the total supply chain’s) costs. Various functional forms for such incentive schemes have been proposed, but a critical assumption always made is that the supplier has full information abo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Studies in Regional Science
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0287-6256,1880-6465
DOI: 10.2457/srs.31.3_209