Tractable combinatorial auctions and b-matching
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tractable Combinatorial Auctions Via Graph Matching
Combinatorial auctions play a key role in distributed AI as a mechanism for efficiently allocating resources or tasks, both for cooperative and competitive scenarios. The complexity of the general problem has lead to interest in finding efficient algorithms for useful instances. Tennenholtz introduced an approach which finds polynomial solutions for certain classes of combinatorial auctions by ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/s0004-3702(02)00229-1