Towards Minimizing Disappointment in Repeated Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Towards Minimizing Disappointment in Repeated Games
We consider the problem of learning in repeated games against arbitrary associates. Specifically, we study the ability of expert algorithms to quickly learn effective strategies in repeated games, towards the ultimate goal of learning near-optimal behavior against any arbitrary associate within only a handful of interactions. Our contribution is three-fold. First, we advocate a new metric, call...
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These notes are largely based on a survey on learning, regret minimization and equilibria written by Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour, and appearing as Chapter 4 of [NRTV07]. The main difference are in the presentation rather than in the content, and in the inclusion of Section 1.5. The notes correspond to two 2-hour lectures in the course on algorithmic game theory given in the Weizmann Institute...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1076-9757
DOI: 10.1613/jair.4202