Toppling the Pyramids: Physics Without Physical State Monism

Abstract In this paper, we challenge a wide-spread assumption among philosophers that contemporary physics supports physical state monism . This is the claim causal powers of system supervene upon ‘lower-level’ laws and lower-level cosmos (as represented by our ‘best physics’). On view, it makes sense to ignore macroscopic system’s higher-level properties in determining its powers, since any are merely artifacts special interests. We argue common both microphysicalism , which carves into set microscopic constituents, priority posits single cosmic substance, but incompatible with form pluralism attributes irreducibly entities intermediate scales. consider number case studies fail support thesis monism. many systems (determined by) higher-level, neither reducible nor weakly emergent, compatible some kind affirms these robustly real. A pluralist ontology likely have implications for discussions free will agency.