Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly

Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly

We study the incentives of oligopolistic firms to share private information on demand parameters. Differently from previous studies, we consider bilateral sharing agreements, by which firms commit at the ex-ante stage to truthfully share information. We show that if signals are i.i.d., then pairwise stable networks of sharing agreements are either empty or made of fully connected components of ...

T.M.I. (Too much information)?

P arents of teenagers will recognize the following scenario: parent comprehensively lecturing teenager on some topic at hand, carefully outlining the rationale for a parental decision, invoking extensive reasoning of why one option is better than another for good adolescent decision-making, etc, etc. Teenager looks away, rolls eyes (possibly, but not necessarily outside of visual field of paren...

Too Much Information ?

A seller often needs to determine the amount of product information to provide to consumers. We model costly consumer information search in the presence of limited information. We derive the consumer’s optimal stopping rule for the search process. We find that, in general, there is an intermediate amount of information that maximizes the likelihood of purchase. If too much information is provid...

Deriving the Exact Cost Function for a Two-Level Inventory System with Information Sharing

In this paper we consider a two-level inventory system with one warehouse and one retailer with information exchange. Transportation times are constant and retailer faces independent Poisson demand. The retailer applies continuous review (R,Q)-policy. The supplier starts with m initial batches (of size Q), and places an order to an outside source immediately after the retailer’s inventory posit...

Information Sharing