Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinant Strategy in Repeated Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. then show that Tit-for-Tat strategy prisoner’s dilemma game is a strategy, which unilaterally equalizes probability distribution functions payoffs two players.
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the Physical Society of Japan
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0031-9015', '1347-4073']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7566/jpsj.90.025002