Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games

Target Controllability and Time Consistency: Complement to the Tinbergen Rule

wpcomunite.it ●●●○○○ Conflict of Interests, (Implicit) Coalitions and Nash Policy Games

By introducing the concepts of implicit coalitions and con‡ict of interests in a multiple-player context, this paper generalizes some theorems on policy invariance and equilibrium existence and uniqueness for LQ policy games. JEL: C72, E52, E61

Pricing and Advertising Decisions in a Three-level Supply Chain with Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative Games

Pricing and advertising are two important marketing strategies in the supply chain management which lead to customer demand’s increase and therefore higher profit for members of supply chains. This paper considers advertising, and pricing decisions simultaneously for a three-level supply chain with one supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. The amount of market demand is influenced ...

Nash Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in Congestion Games Nash Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in Congestion Games

Communication infrastructures and markets are maintained and used by millions of entities each of them facing a private objective. The vast number of participants in conjunction with their individual goals to choose the best alternative gave rise to study such scenarios in the framework of game theory as it is rather unrealistic to assume that a centrally computed solution can be implemented. I...

Coevolutionary Nash in poker games

We address the problem of learning good policies in poker games. The classical game theoretic approach to this problem specifies a Nash equilibrium solution, i.e., a pair of secure mixed (randomized) policies. We describe a new approach for calculating such secure policies based on coevolution. Here, populations of pure policies for both players are simultaneously evolved by repeated comparison...