منابع مشابه
Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
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We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount...
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متن کاملNash implementation via hyperfunctions
Hyperfunctions are social choice rules which assign sets of alternatives to preference profiles over sets. So, they are more general objects compared to standard (social choice) correspondences. Thus every correspondence can be expressed in terms of an equivalent hyperfunction. We postulate the equivalence between implementing a correspondence and its equivalent hyperfunction. We give a partial...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.002