Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing
We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First , we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competi...
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A buyer of a divisible good faces several identical sellers. The buyer’s preferences are her private information, and they may directly affect the sellers’ profits (common values). Sellers compete by posting menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the buyer can simultaneously and privately trade with several sellers. We focus on the finitetype case, and we provide a full characterization of pu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00084-8