Thomas Aquinas on the Relation Between Cognition and Emotion

Thomas Aquinas on the Relation Between Cognition and Emotion Christopher A. Bobier SCHOLARLY interpretations of relation between cognition emotion are divided along cognitive noncognitive lines.1 Some scholars think that Thomistic emotions noncognitive, purely conative impulses: “Aquinas’s account emotion,” William Lyons writes, is “in terms impulses or desires, accompanying physiological changes feelings, rather than in evaluations.” 2 While cognitions cause sustain emotions, [End Page 219] they not constituent parts emotions. I label any reading denies a part reading. Other scholars, by contrast, argue are, essentially involve, certain types cognition. “Since attitudinal responses sensory orexis [i.e., appetite] either to objects intended as simple goods evils complex evils,” Mark Drost argues, “the have component them.”3 On this reading, an has three parts: eliciting sustaining cognition, appetitive movement, change. affords role Despite profound difference these two readings, little been done bring them into conversation with one another.4 This surprising because debate ramifications 220] for our understanding how relate reason, rationality, morality. Robert C. Roberts, instance, argues Aquinas’s position do include component—they impulses—and turn entails cannot justice rationality 5 Maria Carl, turn, intrinsically Roberts’s criticism therefore misguided.6 The versus also applicability present-day issues. For Giuseppe Butera philosophical psychology can “serve theoretical framework” therapy.7 A problem, notes, that, “whereas CT makes sharp distinction their cognitions, APP [Aquinas’s psychology] does not.”8 If, however, distinguish from then Butera’s point about apt. aim article thus twofold. First, present case endorsing both emotion, highlighting merits each position. My goal competing discussion another, something largely neglected recent studies. Second, favor according which caused but distinct cognitions. 221] I. Noncognitive Cognitive Readings identifies moved-responses appetite (De Verit., q. 26, a. 3; STh I-II, 22).9 These passive active component. Emotions need be actualized: needs presented particular good evil object order occur. To clear, actualizes material object. recognizes while Attila experiences fear upon seeing wolf, Henrietta may experience delight. What movement Attila’s Henrietta’s wolf threatening. refers evaluative “intentions.” Intentions judgments enable cognize relative one’s interests (STh I, 78, 4; I–II, 22, 2, ad De 4). sheep judges dangerous feared, only wolf’s perceptual qualities (e.g., color), most judgment it, reached way Once formed...