Third Person Enforcement in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Scale-invariant behavior in a spatial game of prisoners' dilemma.
A spatially extended version of the game of prisoner's dilemma, originally proposed by Nowak and May, is modified to include stochastic updating and found to exhibit scale-invariant behavior. Two critical regimes with different scaling behaviors are found; the corresponding exponents have been determined numerically. Spatially, the critical states are characterized by the existence of delicatel...
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We have developed a new agent-based simulation tool to model social dilemmas for the case of a large number of not necessarily rational decision-makers (Szilagyi and Szilagyi, 2000). The combination of various personalities with stochastic learning makes it possible to simulate the multi-person Prisoners’ Dilemma game for realistic situations. A variety of personality profiles and their arbitra...
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* I want to thank Hans Haller and Mark Stegeman for their valuable suggestions and support. The paper benefited from the comments of participants in the 1997 SITE Summer Workshop. Abstract We consider a population of players playing a Prisoners' Dilemma Game in a local interaction setting, using a formalism of automata networks. Sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium where cooper...
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Cooperation has always been recognised as a fundamental ingredient in the creation of societies and the generation of wealth. As a concept, it has been studied for many years. Yet, in practice, its emergence and persistence are less understood. In the following a game theoretic approach to the study of cooperation based on the Prisoners' Dilemma is reviewed. Using a Genetic Algorithm, strategie...
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We ...nd that cooperation as equilibrium of the in...nitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma is often not plausible: For a signi...cant subset of the payo¤discount factor parameter space, all co-operation equilibria are strictly risk dominated (in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) by defection. We derive an easy-to-calculate critical level for the discount factor ±¤ below which this...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2133313