Theories of Psychosis versus: What It Is Like

نویسندگان

چکیده

Theories of Psychosis versusWhat It Is Like Sofia Jeppsson (bio) In his interesting comments on my article, Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed distinguishes between different senses in which one can try to render psychosis “intelligible.” One might explain what the psychotic worldview looks like from inside and it is go through this kind experience, or present an intelligible theory about psychosis. Philosophers psychiatry have, course, mostly been preoccupied with latter project, and, according Rashed, so am I, despite stated intention do former. To some extent, I believe fair criticism. All philosophers whose interests touch phenomenology are likely prone over-intellectualizing their experiences, likewise be intellectualize experiences a way that turn them into something non-philosophers not altogether recognize. By this, mean say descriptions explanations true memories thereof, but fact philosopher influence how experience remember things first place. If social sciences humanities complicated by observing people changes observes, should especially when scholars observe themselves. Nevertheless, will push back against critique: theorizing, hand, understanding was for someone other, projects as radically suggests. argue claim whereas we understand most people’s actions terms beliefs, desires, reasons, must use special understanding—focused bizarre they affect speech behavior—to people. point out matter fact, there plenty non-psychotic perfectly commonplace behavior rather than former, beliefs reasons given. We need mix these allegedly types whether person want not. But explaining one’s belief action require depending basis. give examples, text, causal provide no intelligibility sense—no insight like, nor person’s seen own view—like hypothesis delusional have lost ability accurately assess probabilities. also, occasionally, move pure what-it-is-like-territory, compare threatening feeling significance foreshadowing horror movie. don’t explanation just is; movie analogy best attempt [End Page 257] at describing accessible other discussion bedrock loss very much straddles line trying describe theorizing it. Although lament article having your previously firm crumble beneath (metaphorical epistemological) feet hard picture who has never there, nevertheless you feel. once lost, lacking bedrock, also lack any reason trust arguments real Here, potential general phenomenon—psychotic seem impossible with—but trust, example, doctor he claimed imagining things, part time. sat thinking were bad ones, because kept presupposing ought proved—that right wrong, reality neat separation between, couched such terms, what...

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Psychosis: what it is and what it is not. Psychiatric diagnosis an an ethical problem.

The different causes of misdiagnosis in psychiatry are reviewed, and the ethical implications of such misdiagnoses are discussed.

متن کامل

Psychosis Risk: What Is It and How Should We Talk About It?

Schizophrenia and other psychosis spectrum disorders do not develop de novo but emerge from prodromal stages that are named and operationalized differently depending on the research group or consortium and its theoretical orientation. As a result, a complex lexicon now exists for characterizing individuals' risk of subclinical symptoms converting to psychosis. Researchers aim to develop instrum...

متن کامل

If There Is Something It Is Like to Be Alife, What Is It?

In the field of consciousness studies, the phrase ‘Is there something it is like to be X?’, derived from Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ (Nagel 1974), has become an acceptable way of asking whether X is conscious. It is my contention that this is a question that should be asked in the context of artificial organisms of the type studied in Alife, and especially of physically embodied orga...

متن کامل

What Is It Like to Be a Brain Simulation?

We frame the question of what kind of subjective experience a brain simulation would have in contrast to a biological brain. We discuss the brain prosthesis thought experiment. Then, we identify finer questions relating to the original inquiry, and set out to answer them moving forward from both a general physicalist perspective, and pan-experientialism. We propose that the brain simulation is ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1071-6076', '1086-3303']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2021.0039