Theorem of the Maximin and Applications to Bayesian Zero-Sum Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A theorem of the maximin and applications to Bayesian zero-sum games
Consider a family of zero-sum games indexed by a parameter that determines each player’s payoff function and feasible strategies. Our first main result characterizes continuity assumptions on the payoffs and the constraint correspondence such that the equilibrium value and strategies depend continuously and upper hemicontinuously (respectively) on the parameter. This characterization uses two t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1551352