منابع مشابه
A Theory of "Yes Men"
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متن کامل”Yes Men,” Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts
In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of “yes man” behavior in organizations, Prendergast (1993) argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that there is a trade-off between inducing a worker to exert costly effort and inducing him to tell the truth. In contrast, we...
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Regular readers of this Journal will recall that it was just over a year ago that I was commissioned to explore the issue of ‘Grey Sex’:1 sexuality in the older age group and the challenges that raises for health professionals, not least in leading us to acknowledge that for human beings the sexual impulse does not inevitably fade. Fast forward, and in this Journal issue I want to explore sex a...
متن کاملYes, I wear the Hijab. Yes, I am a Doctor.
No, I am not a patient. Yes, I can hear you. Yes, I can still use my stethoscope. Yes, I can speak English. Yes, I can speak Arabic you’re welcome. I am honoured that you were hoping I would call your name in the waiting room. How can I help? We are the same. Yes, I have changed this hijab and covered it with a surgical balaclava, I am sterile. No, I do not want to wear this sterile green drape...
متن کامل“ Yes men ” , integrity , and the optimal design of incentive contracts q
In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of “yes man” behavior in organizations, Prendergast [American Economic Review 83 (1993) 757–770] argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that there is a trade-off between inducing a worker to exert costly effort and inducing ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: M/C Journal
سال: 2003
ISSN: 1441-2616
DOI: 10.5204/mcj.2190