The Wait-and-See Option in Ascending Price Auctions
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Wait and See Option in Ascending Price Auctions
Ascending auctions offer agents the option to wait and see before deciding to drop out. We show that in contexts where as time proceeds agents get finer and finer estimates of their valuations, incentives to drop out at one’s expected valuation are weak: it is optimal for agents to wait and see. We first illustrate the claim in a private value setting. We next analyze an interdependent value se...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the European Economic Association
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1542-4766,1542-4774
DOI: 10.1162/154247604323068177