The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
This note analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain whether his rival has a head start, i.e., an initial advantage in the auction. The game has a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome whose shape depends on the expected head start. In equilibrium, the potentially stronger player generates an informational rent if and only if he...
متن کاملCommon-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions in which the players have ex-ante asymmetric information represented by nite partitions of the set of possible values of winning. We consider a family of such auctions in which no player has an information advantage over his opponent. We nd su¢ cient conditions for the existence of equilibrium in monotonic strategies. We further show that the ...
متن کاملAsymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced. JEL Classification...
متن کاملCommon-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
We study a class of two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over his opponent and both players are budget-constrained. We extend the results for all-pay auctions with complete information, and show that in our class of all-pay auctions with asymmetric information, su¢ ciently high (...
متن کاملAll-Pay-All Auctions
We consider a class of auctions in which bidders receive (asymmetric) shares of the amount of money raised. Examples include corporate takeovers when potential acquirers have “toeholds” and auctions used to raise money for a public good. We show that the optimal selling mechanism in these cases is a simple “all-pay-all” auction in which all bidders pay a weighted sum of all bids. When bidders r...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.007