The Valence Side of the EU: EU Issue Voting in the Aftermath of the Eurozone Crisis

In the aftermath of Euro crisis, EU issues have increasingly affected electoral behaviour, explaining a sizable shift in votes from Europhile to Eurosceptic parties. This paper advances argument that issue voting is not entirely encompassed divisive (pro-/anti-) dimension, testing hypothesis valence currently conditioning behaviour. particular, we posit voters support parties evaluating their credibility achieving only positional goals (‘leave/remain’ EU), but also ones (i.e., making country count more Europe). Furthermore, assess which – pro-/anti-EU are likely be supported on basis this issue. Based survey data France (2017) and Italy (2018), found an important predictor, with pro-EU mainly benefitting it. Nach der Eurokrise haben sich EU-Themen zunehmend auf das Wahlverhalten ausgewirkt und eine beträchtliche Stimmenverlagerung von europhilen zu euroskeptischen Parteien erklärt. Dieser Beitrag vertritt die These, dass Abstimmungsverhalten nicht vollständig spaltende (Pro-/Anti-) EU-Dimension zurückzuführen ist. Stattdessen testen wir Hypothese, derzeitige vor allem Wählerpräferenzen Bezug EU-Valenz beeinflusst wird. Insbesondere gehen davon aus, Wähler jene unterstützen, nur glaubwürdig bei Verwirklichung EU-Positionszielen (Verlassen/Verbleib sondern auch EU-Valenzzielen (d.h. Stärkung des Landes Europa) erscheinen. Darüber hinaus messen wir, welche pro/anti-EU basierend dieser Valenzfrage eher unterstützen. Auf Grundlage Umfragedaten aus Frankreich Italien (2018) zeigen ein wichtiger Prädiktor für ist, wobei pro-europäische ihr profitieren. A la suite de crise l’Euro, les enjeux européens ont affecté manière croissante le comportement électoral, expliquant un transfert significatif voix partis politiques europhiles vers ceux europhobes. Cette contribution avance l'argument que électoraux ne sont pas entièrement inclus dans une dimension Européenne clivante (pro/contre). Elle teste l'hypothèse vote sur pour l’UE conditionne actuellement électoral. En particulier, nous avançons électeurs choisissent soutenir en évaluant leur crédibilité à achever non seulement objectifs positionnels (« quitter/demeurer» au sein l’UE), mais aussi consensuels (rendre pays plus influent l’UE). De plus, évaluons quels (pro/anti UE) même d’être soutenus base cet objectif valence. appuyant données deux sondages, et Italie confirmons l'enjeu par est prédicteur du vote, bénéficiant principalement pro-UE. The 2017 French presidential election 2018 Italian general occurred at critical stage for Europe. crisis had acted as catalyst political change, transforming European integration into source contestation (Hooghe & Marks, 2018) was driver success (Hobolt Vries, 2016). were no exception trend, anti-EU parties’ positions matching growing voters’ attitudes (Hernandez Kriesi, Several works analysed impact known (De 2007). Although Europe still remains relatively weaker predictor compared others such left-right (e.g., Carrieri, 2020a; 2010; Tillman, 2004) its explanatory power has steadily increased following Tilley, article argue evaluate based positions, own play role inter-governmental arena. desire make one's does constitute disagreement amongst can conceived related politics. Thus, introduce here idea voting, defined process individual assessments party transformed choices. Focusing aspects politics hypothesises becoming relevant, even when controlling voting. Moreover, explore benefitted Our expectations exploit than parties, while latter should benefit issues. We test these hypotheses Italy, two countries where our allows case selection may somewhat limited, it provides some information. Firstly, epitomised trend politicisation (along relevance) (Conti al., 2021; Evans Ivaldi, 2018). Secondly, both recently seen (Emanuele 2020; Lachat Michel, 2020). empirical results confirm relevance show gained However, significant difference emerges between organised follows: first, introduces discussion politics; second, reviews main contributions competition presenting study; then, data, operationalisation variables, methodology discussed, finally, presented. Conclusions follow. Downsean model relies geometric representation policy preferences, parties/voters aligned along continuum proximity being responsible choices (Downs, 1957). approach implies prevalently framed assumes uni-dimensionality most notably conflict. been challenged by saliency theories, according concern conflict different emphasis campaigns (Budge Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996; Petrocik 2003). Stokes (1963), introduced strategic resource tend attention those favourable them. Following tradition, ownership theories shown how compete introducing new do fit unidimensional space (Riker, 1986) and/or selectively emphasising they (where reputational advantage), trying silence adversaries 1996). concept politics, proposing many exclusively terms.22 note referred non-issue factors influencing leadership images partisanship) (Clark 2004,2009). paper, adhere restricted notion focusing framed. Challenging models competition, developed theory non-spatial revolving around non-divisive issues, assessment who (among several parties) credible shared goal. When stake, “there spatial variation locations voters, there competition” 2009: 40). instances, rely achieve rather taking (Stokes, 1963), thus framing choice terms problem solving mobilisation Sio Lachat, uni-dimensional space, postulated multi-dimensional made up either or terms. scholars since tried develop theoretical understand competition. Amongst these, briefly review relevant ones, namely 1983) (Petrocik, Saliency assumptions. emphasise them (Budge, 1982, 2001; Budge 1983). ‘Selective emphasis’ ‘direct confrontation’ considered strategy reason assumed prefer one course action 2001:82), leading converge towards same position mostly applies selective tool whereby highlight differences 2001). Thirdly, reward perceived competence certain areas salient 1982). Yet, lacked criticism. Dolezal his colleagues (2014) showed that, contrary theory's expectations, “in ‘selective emphasis’” (Dolezal 2014: 58), Finally, structured D’Alimonte al. (2020) suggest use signal stances Issue “the ability [of party] resolve voters. It reputation program interests, produced history attention, initiative, innovation toward problems” 1996: 826). At level, during campaign (Bélanger Meguid, 2008). Instead, perception dealing care about 2008; 2014). Also, relation neglecting, original form, ones. How influences voter behaviour less clear 2014; Van Brug, 2004), clearly distinguishing associative (Walgrave 2012). Associative refers long-term specific party, whereas deal While dimensions traditionally conflated congruence association cannot taken granted stake (Lachat, could actually associated issue, necessarily competent strongly disagree objectives pursued All all, although considerations part 2014), rarely studies 2015; see 2014 exception). Looking approaches study noted perspectives seldom integrated comprehensive framework (Guinaudeau Persico, recent attempt together context Competition Comparative Project (ICCP). ICCP studying placing ‘all par’ (D’Alimonte 2020: 529), allowing analysing comparing symmetric way. ICCP, treated “issue goals”, involving rival “Expand welfare state” vs. “Reduce taxes”) single, goal “Boost economic growth”). second step, conceptualised goal-related affinity. party-voter, affinity measured party's “credibility” preferred generalisation “competence”, applicable goals. Indeed, suitable gauge party-voter Walgrave 2015) ones; credibility, instead, apply latter, ideological differentiations among hardly very technical “competence” deemed (in)competent economy (in terms), easily so referring goals, ‘reducing taxes’ ‘strengthening state’. On (positional) competence, seems appropriate capture affinity.33 advance another argument: if ‘technically’ implement (say “reduce taxes”), expect used opposite (“strengthen welfare”), wished. contrary, assuming trade-off objectives, simultaneously other. Consequently, unlike equivalents (proximity competence), measures voter-party unified fashion. leverage together. before doing so, necessary clarify whether affects national electorates. preferences regarding directly affect elections 2010). Traditionally, model, EU-related terms, 2007, however, Kuechler, 1991 competence-based position-focused modelling voting). boil down antagonists supporters integration. evidence suggests consensus prevails over confrontation recurrently consensual frame generally revolves country's interest 2014) concerns governments better deals supranational level (Schneider, 2013). These findings consistent strand literature, focused relationship output public opinion (Toshkov, 2011). Parties seek responsiveness means position-taking/defending within Councils, commitments (Hagemann 2017; Schneider, 2019, According governments, bear burden decision-making aware will evaluated defend interests (whatever be) To (re-)elected elections, credit themselves strengthening bargaining literature sporadically responsive Councils (Wratil, 2018), supporting grounded divide try gain signalling what done intend level. often vein, defence institutions Surprisingly enough, studied 2013), effects (EU voting) received scant attention. H1 voting): deem Europe, electorally party. complement hypothesis, caveat needs added. goal, specifying quite objective which, conceal trade-offs. definition are, interpreted differently elites. relates critique against many, fact, exist abstractions conflicts - i.e., extent generically (Van 2017). clarified nature something established empirically, looking real distribution electorate given moment. Besides possible implications end reality campaign. want stronger greater autonomy integration). divisions remain irrelevant long regard, last ‘making Europe’ distinct ‘leave vs remain’ item Electoral benefits deriving distributed equally across propose inequality result mobilising strategies adopted various types, particular desiring more/less integration; Ray, 1999). classified relying Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES, Bakker 2020) Ray's classification (1999). Democratic Party (PD), Go (FI), More (+EU) Free Equals (LeU); France, candidates Hamon, Macron Fillon. Anti-EU League, Brothers (FdI) Five Star Movement (M5S); Arthaud, Poutou, Mélenchon, Dupont-Aignan, Le Pen Asselineau included group.44 Existing datasets provide Dupont-Aignan Asselineau. classify candidates, relied (Evans Ivaldi Pro-EU deflect conflict, avoiding perils intra-party factionalism locking payoffs dominant Vries Hobolt, They adopt problem-solving strategies, priming skills profiling other 2020), Council differentiate exploiting profile win (Taggart, 1998). regarded dynamic entrepreneurs conflict-mobilisation rally (Eurosceptic) H2a: Voters H2b: Three contenders ran Italy. centre-right coalition, radical right actors League FdI Berlusconi's FI. centre-left incumbent PD minor progressive formations (not including LeU, list left coalition). M5S, populist post-ideological rejected alliances underline identity (Maggini Chiaramonte, 2019). Despite dominated immigration three FdI, M5S conveyed messages 2021). PD, led Renzi, highlighted hard Council, claiming (Salvati, Similarly, (+EU), ‘niche’ emphasised address marked heavy defeat FI, emerging winning jointly receiving 50% total votes. Both 2021), reversing pre-existing pattern weak (Carrieri, 2020b). As well, law55 mixed system, thirds seats assigned proportional formula third SMD. probably allowed cast sincere system did automatically create majority, subsequently coalesced common platform, forming post-electoral coalition government. held party-polarisation. Before election, Socialist (PS) Republicans (LR) shifted extreme respective Hamon Fillon, primaries polarisation fostered emergence centrist actor, Macron's Marche (EM), combining liberal culturally (Lachat committed himself leader He promising restore France's linking need (Schoën-Quinlivan, Meanwhile, Euroscepticism became fully politicised debate. Pen's National Front (FN) prioritised pledging call referendum membership, Mélenchon's Unbowed (FI) hardened (Ivaldi, first round witnessed FN EM, qualified run-off. FI won left, once PS LR, suffered historical defeat. ballot, favour confirming previous showing importance (Belot 2013; Cautrès Strudel, round, obtained 66.1% votes, defeating Pen. FN’s backfired second-round, damaging governing him median magnified majority two-round build run-off, transfer first-round candidates. hypotheses, (ICCP) Within CAWI surveys66 information available Supporting carried out (N = 1207) 1000) each country. contain wealth large number (selected experts throughout campaign). others, include issue.77 pre-designed, expert-driven makes domestic contexts detail, procedure degree heterogeneity countries, crucial context. why analysis, ICCP. attitudes, (perceived) any included. dependent variable propensity (PTV). ranges 0 (no probability party) 10 (highest probability) captures competing elections. Compared dichotomous choice, PTVs advantages: allow small Eijk 2006); intra-individual much B (Pardos-Prado, 2012); carry analyses abstract implementing generic focus identification chosen individuals analysis kind requires matrix reshaped stacked (by matrix. yields multiplication observations, row corresponding single respondent (respondent × 2006). Therefore, unit dyad (for dyads system). major participating campaign, while, focal predictors modelled symmetrically scheme 2019), achieved steps: represented goals; operational respondents explicitly asked (lacking trade-offs). For choose implied and, rate measure PTVs,