The turnpike property for dynamic discrete time zero-sum games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Turnpike Property for Dynamic Discrete Time Zero-sum Games
We consider a class of dynamic discrete-time two-player zero-sum games. We show that for a generic cost function and each initial state, there exists a pair of overtaking equilibria strategies over an infinite horizon. We also establish that for a generic cost function f , there exists a pair of stationary equilibria strategies (xf ,yf ) such that each pair of “approximate” equilibria strategie...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Abstract and Applied Analysis
سال: 1999
ISSN: 1085-3375,1687-0409
DOI: 10.1155/s1085337599000020