The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
We analyse and evaluate three decision rules for the Council of Ministers of the EU, which are prescribed by the ‘definitive form’ of the Treaty of Nice. The first will apply from 2005 to the present 15-member EU, if it will not have been enlarged by then. The second or third will apply to an enlarged 27-member EU. We conclude that the first of these is an improvement on the current decision ru...
متن کاملStrategic Voting under the Qualified Majority Rule
This is an analysis of strategic voting under the qualified majority rule. Existing formal analyses of the plurality rule predict the complete coordination of strategic voting: A strict interpretation of Duverger’s Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the popular support for each option is not commonly certain. Agents base their vote on both public and private signals of po...
متن کاملVoting power and Qualified Majority Voting with a “no vote” option
In recent years, enlargement of the European Union has led to increased interest in the allocation of voting weights to member states with hugely differing population numbers. While the eventually agreed voting scheme lacks any strict mathematical basis, the Polish government suggested a voting scheme based on the Penrose definition of voting power, leading to an allocation of voting weights pr...
متن کاملEuropean Convention versus Nice Treaty
The aim of this paper is to analyze the distribution of power in the Council of the enlarged European Union. By using generating funcions, we calculate the Banzhaf power indices for the european countries in the Council of Ministers under the decision rules prescribed by the Treaty of Nice and the new rules proposed by the European Convention. Moreover, we analyze the power of the European citi...
متن کاملThe Treaty of Nice, the presumed end of
The current debate regarding the future of the European Union (EU) is underpinned by three fundamental assumptions. First, the time has now come, the argument goes, for the EU to define its ‘final’ institutional configuration. Second, this endeavour must not – indeed, cannot – be based on the logic of incrementalism that, by and large, has shaped the development of the European Communities/Unio...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s003550100137