The timeous enforcement of trade mark rights

The Emergence of Property Rights Enforcement in Early Trade: A Behavioral Model Without Reputational Effects

The present article focuses on the conditions that allow governments to increase property rights protection because they expect enough income from such action. We develop a behavioral explanation, according to which the answer lies in the growth in the importance, size, and wealth of merchant guilds in the medieval era in Western Europe as well as a somewhat surprising effect of volatile price ...

The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement

Trade and Contract Enforcement

We develop a simple model of trade with imperfect contract enforcement. Courts force the execution of defaulted contracts with parametric probability. In political economic equilibrium, the enforcement of contracts between agents of sovereign nations must be at a level mutually agreed between nations. The enforcement probability may be low, with the reluctant nation being associated with low le...

Does Trade Foster Contract Enforcement?

Contract enforcement is probabilistic, but the probability depends on rules and processes. A stimulus to trade may induce traders to alter rules or processes to improve enforcement. In the model of this paper, such a positive knock-on effect occurs when the elasticity of supply of traders is sufficiently high. Negative knock-on is possible when the elasticity is low. Enforcement strategies in c...

Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights