The timeliness of performance information in determining executive compensation
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Timeliness of Performance Information in Determining Executive Compensation
We study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation Ž . decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers CEO throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidenc...
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Incentives and Information Asymmetry of Managerial Talent in Executive Compensation
We test for information structure in executive compensation. The optimal compensation contract in the principal agent model implies that incentives increase with the level of managerial talent only if information about managerial talent is asymmetric in that executives have better information than shareholders. We find positive relations between the payperformance sensitivity and the level of m...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Corporate Finance
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0929-1199
DOI: 10.1016/s0929-1199(99)00011-5