The Strong Price of Anarchy of Linear Bottleneck Congestion Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bottleneck Congestion Games with Logarithmic Price of Anarchy
We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their paths. However, the Nash equilibria of such games are inefficient since the price of anarchy can be very high and proportional to the size of the network. In order...
متن کاملPolynomial Bottleneck Congestion Games with Optimal Price of Anarchy
We study bottleneck congestion games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck congestion games, the utility costs of the players are determined by the worst congested resources that they use. However, the resulting Nash equilibria are inefficie...
متن کاملStrong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games
Strong Nash equilibria and Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are natural and important strengthenings of the Nash equilibrium concept. We study these stronger notions of equilibrium in congestion games, focusing on the relationships between the price of anarchy for these equilibria and that for standard Nash equilibria (which is well understood). For symmetric congestion games with polynomial or e...
متن کاملPrice of Anarchy of Wireless Congestion Games
In this paper, we consider a resource allocation game with heterogenous players competing for limited resources. We model this as a singleton congestion game, where the share of each player is a decreasing function of the number of players selecting the same resource. In particular, we consider player-specific payoffs that depend not only on the shares of resource, but also on different prefere...
متن کاملOptimal Price of Anarchy of Polynomial and Super-Polynomial Bottleneck Congestion Games
We introduce (super) polynomial bottleneck games, where the utility costs of the players are (super) polynomial functions of the congestion of the resources that they use, and the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. In particular, the delay function for any resource r is of the form CMr r , where Cr is the congestion measured as the number of players that use r, a...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory of Computing Systems
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1432-4350,1433-0490
DOI: 10.1007/s00224-014-9598-9