منابع مشابه
Strategic approval voting in a large electorate
The paper considers approval voting for a large population of voters. It is proven that, based on statistical information about candidate scores, rational voters vote sincerly and according to a simple behavioral rule. It is also proven that if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected. ∗Thanks to Steve Brams, Nicolas Gravel, François Maniquet, Remzi Sanver and Karine Van der Straete...
متن کاملSincerity in Simple and Complex Voting Mechanisms
We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus de ne sincerity as the optimal behavior when conditions to vote strategically diminish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type (simple voting mechanisms) we show that eliminating some conditions for strategic voting, individuals opti...
متن کاملPattern matching encryption, strategic equivalence of range voting and approval voting, and statistical robustness of voting rules
We present new results in the areas of cryptography and voting systems. 1. Pattern matching encryption: We present new, general definitions for queryable encryption schemes – encryption schemes that allow evaluation of private queries on encrypted data without performing full decryption. We construct an efficient queryable encryption scheme supporting pattern matching queries, based on suffix t...
متن کاملIs Approval Voting Optimal Given Approval Votes?
Some crowdsourcing platforms ask workers to express their opinions by approving a set of k good alternatives. It seems that the only reasonable way to aggregate these k-approval votes is the approval voting rule, which simply counts the number of times each alternative was approved. We challenge this assertion by proposing a probabilistic framework of noisy voting, and asking whether approval v...
متن کاملWeighted Approval Voting
To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting [7] by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-013-0775-x