The Strategic Advantage of Inequality Averse Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences
We study certain classes of supermodular and submodular games which are symmetric with respect to material payoffs but in which not all players seek to maximize their material payoffs. Specifically, a subset of players have negatively interdependent preferences and care not only about their own material payoffs but also about their payoffs relative to others. We identify sufficient conditions u...
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We study rent-seeking contests, where the set of players contains two groups of players — one with independent preferences and the other with interdependent preferences. It turns out that the latter experience a strategic advantage in general two-player contests and in n-player-contests with nonincreasing marginal efficiency. As to the case of general n-player contests with increasing marginal ...
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Individuals’ preferences for risk and inequality are measured through choices between imagined societies and lotteries. The median relative risk aversion, which is often seen to reflect social inequality aversion, is between 2 and 3. Most people are also found to be individually inequality-averse, reflecting a willingness to pay for living in a more equal society. Left-wing voters and women are...
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Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive equivalent criteria both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of superand submodular games. The...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Bogazici Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1300-9583
DOI: 10.21773/boun.26.2.3