The Stability of Conditional Cooperation: Egoism Trumps Reciprocity in Social Dilemmas
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity
The present study attempts to connect cooperative behavior in the repeated play prisoner’s dilemma (RPPD) with ‘‘trusting’’ and ‘‘reciprocal’’ behavior. Our goal is to see if people with different propensities to cooperate exhibit differing degrees of trust and reciprocity. We find the subjects who choose to cooperate in a RPPD game exhibit higher levels of trust. However when it comes to recip...
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We introduce a framework for studying social dilemmas in networked societies where individuals follow a simple state-based behavioral mechanism based on generalized reciprocity, which is rooted in the principle “help anyone if helped by someone”. Within this general framework, which applies to a wide range of social dilemmas including, among others, public goods, donation and snowdrift games, w...
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Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by pure defectors, and incentivize cooperation from the rest. However, often the actions taken by a partner are (partially) unobserved or the consequences of i...
متن کاملConsequentialist Conditional Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Imperfect Information
Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by pure defectors, and incentivize cooperation from the rest. However, often the actions taken by a partner are (partially) unobserved or the consequences of i...
متن کاملConsequentialist Conditional Cooperation in Social Dilemmas with Imperfect Information
Social dilemmas, where mutual cooperation can lead to high payoffs but participants face incentives to cheat, are ubiquitous in multi-agent interaction. We wish to construct agents that cooperate with pure cooperators, avoid exploitation by pure defectors, and incentivize cooperation from the rest. However, often the actions taken by a partner are (partially) unobserved or the consequences of i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3468176