The Sources of Financing Constraints
نویسندگان
چکیده
Which financial frictions drive firms’ financing constraints? We structurally estimate dynamic firm models embedding many frictions, on panels of public firms and private firms. focus limited enforcement, moral hazard, trade-off assess which rationalize best observed corporate policies across various samples. Our tests, based empirical policy function benchmarks, favor for larger firms, commitment smaller hazard Private estimates suggest significant constraints due to agency highlight the importance identifying their sources valuation.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1879-2774', '0304-405X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.07.018