The Socially Stable Core in Structured Transferable Utility Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on any coalition, for instance a network, a hierarchical ordering or a dominance relation. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by its social structure and is measured by a power function. We call a payoff vector socially stable if there ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.535362