The simple and multiple job assignment problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Production Research
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0020-7543,1366-588X
DOI: 10.1080/002075400418207