The Short Selling Regulation in the EU: Assessing the Authorization Granted for ESMA to Prohibit Short Selling
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Government and Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2254-7088
DOI: 10.17979/ejge.2017.6.1.4321