The Secretary Problem with a Selection Committee: Do Conformist Committees Hire Better Secretaries?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Secretary Problem with a Selection Committee: Do Conformist Committees Hire Better Secretaries?
This paper analyses a variation of the secretary problem in which two selectors, with different fields of interest, each want to appoint one of the n candidates with as much expertise as possible in their field. Selectors simultaneously vote to accept or reject: Unanimous decisions are respected and candidates with a split decision are hired with probability p. Each candidate arrives with exper...
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Firms often delegate important decisions to committees which are set up speci cally for that purpose; for example selection committees. We analyze the equilibrium behavior of a game in which committee members (the players) interview candidates sequentially, either hiring or going on to the next one. The players have di¤ering evalutions of candidates (e.g. one cares about typing skills; the othe...
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The secretary problem with uncertain selection, considered by Smith, is generalized to allow for the rejection probability to be rank-dependent. That is, if an offer of employment is given to the j-th best applicant, she rejects it with probability q j , 1 < j <, n (n is the number of applicants to appear). The optimality equations can be derived with the objective of maximizing the probability...
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— We consider the secretary problem when the candidates are interviewed in batches of two at each stage and cost of interviewing is present. Closedform asymptotic resuïts are derived and are compared with case when there is no recall of the candidates. There is a small réduction in the expected loss when the interview cost is a power functiôn which is nonconstant.
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Online auction is an essence of many modern markets, particularly networked markets, in which information about goods, agents, and outcomes is revealed over a period of time, and the agents must make irrevocable decisions without knowing future information. Optimal stopping theory, especially the classic secretary problem, is a powerful tool for analyzing such online scenarios which generally r...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2377