The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Revelation Principles in Multistage Games∗
We study the revelation principle in multistage games for perfect Bayesian equilibium and sequential equilibrium. The question of whether or not the revelation principle holds is subtle, as expanding players’ opportunities for communication expands the set of consistent beliefs at off-path information sets. In settings with adverse selection but no moral hazard, Nash, perfect Bayesian, and sequ...
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The strategic interactions among the designer of a mechanism and its participants can be modeled as a multi-stage game. The designer moves first by selecting a mechanism. The participants observe the mechanism, and move thereafter. For ease of exposition, we restrict our present attention to a two-stage game, in which the participants play a simultaneous-move (i.e., one-shot) game in the second...
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This set of lecture notes covers a general model of adverse selection as well as a leading example that of a price discriminating monopolist due to Maskin and Riley (1984). At the end of this unit, students should understand the application of the revelation principal to this class of models, the general solution techniques, and the key economic trade-o¤ e¢ ciency versus information rent sav...
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This paper shows how to characterize the set of outcomes functions that can be supported as equilibrium outcome functions in competing mechanism games. We describe a set of mechanisms we refer to as reciprocal mechanisms. It is show that the set of outcome functions supportable as equilibria in a game in which principals offer reciprocal mechanisms is the same as the set of outcomes supportable...
متن کاملThe revelation principle and regularity conditions
The revelation principle asserts that every outcome brought by a mechanism is realized by a truthful direct mechanism. The present paper investigates the regularity conditions of these two mechanisms in the continuous space of the agent’s type. It questions what regularity condition a general mechanism confers upon a direct mechanism through the revelation principle. By so doing, we elucidate t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdaa041