The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Popular Matchings with Two-Sided Preferences and One-Sided Ties
We are given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) where each vertex has a preference list ranking its neighbors: in particular, every a ∈ A ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, whereas the preference lists of b ∈ B may contain ties. A matching M is popular if there is no matching M ′ such that the number of vertices that prefer M ′ to M exceeds the number that prefer M to M ′. We sho...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.015