THE REGRESS-PROBLEM: A REPLY TO VERMAZEN

A Problem in Avicennas View on the Origination of the Soul and a Reply to It

The Epistemic Regress Problem

The best extant statement of the epistemic regress problem makes assumptions that are too strong. An improved version assumes only that that reasons require support, that no proposition is supported only by endless regresses of reasons, and that some proposition is supported. These assumptions are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Attempts to explain support by means of unconcept...

Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem

We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.

a problem in avicennas view on the origination of the soul and a reply to it

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A Mathematical Theory of Truth with Application to the Regress Problem

Hannes Leitgeb formulated eight norms for theories of truth in his paper [12]: ‘What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be)’. We shall show in the present paper that a theory of truth can be formulated for suitably constructed metalanguages of the first-order language L = {∈} of set theory which conforms with those norms, added by the norm: Metalanguages for which mathematical theorie...