منابع مشابه
Powerful qualities, not pure powers
I explore two accounts of properties within a dispositional essentialist (or causal powers) framework, the pure powers view and the powerful qualities view. I first attempt to clarify precisely what the pure powers view is, and then raise objections to it. I then present the powerful qualities view and, in order to avoid a common misconception, offer a restatement of it that I shall call the tr...
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The best extant statement of the epistemic regress problem makes assumptions that are too strong. An improved version assumes only that that reasons require support, that no proposition is supported only by endless regresses of reasons, and that some proposition is supported. These assumptions are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Attempts to explain support by means of unconcept...
متن کاملEpistemic and Dialectical Regress
Dialectical egalitarianism holds that every asserted proposition requires defence when challenged by an interlocutor. This view apparently generates a vicious “regress of justifications,” since an interlocutor can challenge the premises through which a speaker defends her original assertion, and so on ad infinitum. To halt the regress, dialectical foundationalists such as Adler, Brandom, Leite,...
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§1. The justificatory question What makes it the case that a thinker has justification for a given belief? Call this the justificatory question. I will not attempt to define “justification.” I doubt that a noncircular definition is possible. Roughly speaking, one has justification for a belief just in case one is “epistemically licensed” in forming the belief. As Pryor puts it, “you have justif...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Philosophical Quarterly
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0031-8094,1467-9213
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.507.x