The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Hedge Fund Activism
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Financial Studies
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0893-9454,1465-7368
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhv037