The rational inescapability of value objectivism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Value of a Rose: Rising above Objectivism and Subjectivism
After my conclusion in the previous PrimaVera working paper that objectivism does not provide a firm theoretical foundation for information management, the question probed in this chapter is whether or not subjectivism can offer a convincing alternative basis. Ultimately, the answer is negative because subjectivists rarely specifically pay attention to what is the bottom line for private and, i...
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Belief aims at truth—or so it is said, and there must be something right in the saying. Belief, though, can’t aim literally; it’s we who aim. We aim, moreover, in acting—when we shoot an arrow, say, or more broadly, whenever we act to try to bring something about. Believing isn’t an action; we can’t believe at will. In some extended, metaphorical sense, perhaps, belief does aim at truth. Unders...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Think
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1477-1756,1755-1196
DOI: 10.1017/s1477175600002931