The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods

Auction Theory for Auction Design

* Paper to appear as Chapter 1 in the book " Auctioning Public Assets " edited by Maarten Janssen, to be published by Cambridge University Press. We are grateful to Maarten for inviting us to write this survey. Preparing the survey has made us painfully aware of the gaps in our knowledge of the auction literature and we apologize for all errors and omissions. Tilman Börgers gratefully acknowled...

The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities

Design of the Reverse Auction in the FCC Incentive Auction

We consider important design issues of the reverse auction, a key and innovative part of the FCC’s Incentive Auction. In the reverse auction, broadcasters compete to repurpose television broadcast spectrum for mobile broadband use. The Comment Public Notice (FCC 14-191) outlined the basic structure of the reverse auction. We take that basic structure as given and then examine critical elements ...

Design of the Reverse Auction in the Broadcast Incentive Auction

We consider important design issues of the reverse auction, a key and innovative part of the broadcast television incentive auction. In the reverse auction, broadcasters compete to repurpose television broadcast spectrum for mobile broadband use. The Comment Public Notice (FCC 14 191) outlined the basic structure of the reverse auction. We take that basic structure as given and then examine cri...

Auction Design Goals

Assume a set of n ≥ 2 agents participating in an auction for one good. We adopt the IPV model, so that each agent i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} has value vi drawn from continuous distribution Fi, with support Ti = [v i, v i] for some v i, v i ∈ R+, which describes how much they value the good.1 We call this environment single-parameter, because 1 For simplicity, we sometimes assume symmetry, so that F...