The Prisoners’ Dilemma in collaborative carriers’ request selection

Abstract Logistics providers have to utilize available capacities efficiently in order cope with increasing competition and desired quality of service. One possibility reduce idle capacity is build coalitions other players on the market. While willingness enter such does exist logistics industry, success collaborations strongly depends mutual trust behavior participants. Hence, a proper mechanism design, where carriers do not incentives deviate from jointly established rules, needed. We propose use combinatorial auction system, for which several properties are already well researched but little known about auction’s first phase, decide set requests offered auction. Profitable selection strategies, aiming at maximization total collaboration gains, exist. However, impact individual outcomes, if one or more agreed rules yet be researched. analyze whether participants an auction-based transport face Prisoners’ Dilemma. it possible construct setting, our computational study reveals that profit declining cooperative strategy. This important insightful finding, since further strengthens practical applicability trading mechanisms collaborative transportation.