The Price of Fairness for Indivisible Goods
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Price to Pay for Forgoing Normalization in Fair Division of Indivisible Goods
We study the complexity of fair division of indivisible goods and consider settings where agents can have nonzero utility for the empty bundle. This is a deviation from a common normalization assumption in the literature, and we show that this inconspicuous change can lead to an increase in complexity: In particular, while an allocation maximizing social welfare by the Nash product is known to ...
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Incorporating fairness criteria in optimization problems comes at a certain cost, which is measured by the so-called price of fairness. Here we consider the allocation of indivisible goods. For envy-freeness as fairness criterion it is known from literature that the price of fairness can increase linearly in terms of the number of agents. For the constructive lower bound a quadratic number of i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theory of Computing Systems
سال: 2021
ISSN: 1432-4350,1433-0490
DOI: 10.1007/s00224-021-10039-8