The price of anarchy for polynomial social cost
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost
In this work, we consider an interesting variant of the well studied KP model for selfish routing on parallel links, which reflects some influence from the much older Wardrop model [29]. In the new model, user traffics are still unsplittable and links are identical. Social Cost is now the expectation of the sum, over all links, of Latency Costs; each Latency Cost is modeled as a certain polynom...
متن کاملPrice of Anarchy for Polynomial Wardrop Games
In this work, we consider Wardrop games where traffic has to be routed through a shared network. Traffic is allowed to be split into arbitrary pieces and can be modeled as network flow. For each edge in the network there is a latency function that specifies the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion. In a Wardrop equilibrium, all used paths between a given source-destination pair...
متن کاملExact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games
We show exact values for the price of anarchy of weighted and unweighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions. The given values also hold for weighted and unweighted network congestion games.
متن کاملThe Price of Anarchy
Interstate 5 stretches through California’s San Joaquin valley, straight and flat as far as the eye can see, giving drivers a unique opportunity to observe game theory in action. With only two lanes in each direction, most cars stay in the left lane, zipping past the slow moving trucks, which keep to the right. Every so often, an impatient truck driver lumbers into the left lane, blockading the...
متن کاملPolynomial Bottleneck Congestion Games with Optimal Price of Anarchy
We study bottleneck congestion games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck congestion games, the utility costs of the players are determined by the worst congested resources that they use. However, the resulting Nash equilibria are inefficie...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0304-3975
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2006.07.055