The presence of moral hazard regarding flood insurance and German private businesses

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract There is a movement towards the concepts of integrated flood risk management and governance. In these concepts, each stakeholder prone to flooding tasked with actively limiting impacts. Currently, relatively more research has focused upon adaptation private households not on businesses operating in flood-prone areas. This paper offers an extension this literature business-level by exploring potential presence moral hazard. The analyses are based survey data collected aftermath six floods across Germany between 2002 2013 provide first indication hazard businesses. Moral where increased insurance coverage results policyholders preparing less, increasing they face, counterproductive outcome. We present initial study occurring through three channels: performance emergency measures during flood, changes precautionary behavior employed before given occurred, intention employ additional after flood. find, much like for households, no strong that regarding past adaptation. However, there avenue 2005 lower businesses’ intentions significant policy relevance such as opportunities strengthening link reduction boosting against general.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Natural Hazards

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1573-0840', '0921-030X']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-022-05227-9