The politics of autocratic survival in Equatorial Guinea: Co-optation, restrictive institutional rules, repression, and international projection

Abstract Equatorial Guinea is not only one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes but also a striking case regime and leader survival. This small, oil-rich state personalist defies conventional wisdom because it both far more resilient faces fewer threats from within opposition political parties than other resource-rich states. But how does manage to survive? study argues that four key mechanisms interact explain Guinea’s record Firstly, co-optation (via patronage, party, cabinet appointments) which President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo party—Partido democrático de guinea ecuatorial—have used build internal cohesion fragment opposition. Secondly, crafting restrictive institutional rules (party electoral laws) that, combined with informal rules, aim protect regime’s interests make participation in costly. Thirdly, use (selective diffuse) repression shield shrink living space challengers. Finally, international linkages projection gain credibility offset pressure for change. We argue autocrats’ survival depends on their ability play strategic two-level game: domestic international.