The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions
Why do national governments choose the monetary institutions they do? While this question has long interested political economists, previous literature on the topic suffers from a central limitation: the choices of exchange-rate regime and central bank independence (CBI) have been analyzed in isolation from one another. This is surprising given that prominent arguments from this literature port...
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This paper investigates the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions. We model institutions as fixed costs of entry, in a framework that has two key features. First, preferences over entry costs differ across firms and depend on firm size. Larger firms prefer to set higher costs of entry, in order to reduce competition. Second, these costs are endogenous...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Organization
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0020-8183,1531-5088
DOI: 10.1162/002081802760403748