The Political Economy of Insider Trading Legislation and Enforcement International Evidence

Prioritizing Enforcement in Insider Trading

Aggregate Insider Trading and Future Stock Returns – International Evidence

In this study, I investigate the informativeness of aggregate equity purchases and sales by senior corporate officers and directors in a sample of 39 countries. I find that countrylevel insider trading signals are associated with future country-level market returns, controlling for other contemporaneous signals such as country-level earnings guidance and analysts’ forecasts, and risk factors su...

political economy of china in central asia

this research is about the political economy of china in central asia. in this research the political & economic interactions affected on chinas political economy in central asia are examined. chinas goal of presence in central asia including political-security, economic and energy goals is described in one part. in another part, the trade relations between china and central asian countries ar...

The effect of enforcement on timely loss recognition: Evidence from insider trading laws

I use the first-time enforcement of insider trading laws in sixteen countries as a shock to enforcement and examine its influence on timely loss recognition (TLR). Consistent with greater enforcement increasing the usefulness of accounting information in contracts and thereby the demand for higher quality reporting, insider trading enforcement is associated with a significant increase in TLR. N...

When is public enforcement of insider trading regulations effective?

In this paper we investigate when public enforcement of insider trading regulations reduces the amount of insider trading. We model a game between a potentially self-interested regulator enforcing insider trading laws and a trader who may be trading on inside information. We show that equilibrium strategies exist where despite active enforcement all inside information is used. Furthermore, we f...