The Political Economy of Free Trade Agreements: an Empirical Investigation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Political Economy of Free Trade Agreements: An Empirical Investigation
This paper studies how income inequality affects the probability of signing free trade agreements (FTAs) in a political economy framework. The median voter approach to FTA formation within a Heckscher-Ohlin framework predicts that an increase in inequality lowers the desirability of an FTA if the partner country is relatively labor abundant, ceteris paribus, and raises the desirability of such ...
متن کاملTrade Agreements and Endogenously Incomplete Contracts: A Political Economy Approach
We develop a political economy model of trade agreements that incorporates contracting costs and uncertainty. The model delivers simple expressions for policy bindings with parameters relating to trade shocks and to political demand shocks. We identified conditions under which the trade volume is positively associated with the payoff of restricting production subsidy/consumption tax. Our model ...
متن کاملA political-economic analysis of free-trade agreements: Comment
By Xuepeng Liu Abstract: In his paper in the American Economic Review, Levy (1997) develops a political economy model of free-trade agreements (FTAs). He emphasizes that the homotheticity restriction of the production function assumed for the differentiated product is crucial for his model. This comment shows that this homotheticity assumption is unnecessary and actually problematic. It is prob...
متن کاملPolitical Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation¤
In this paper, we empirically investigate how the ideology of the government in power a®ects trade policy. The prediction of a partisan, ideology-based model (within a two-sector, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin framework) is that left-wing governments will adopt more protectionist trade policies in capital rich countries, but adopt more pro-trade policies in labor rich economies than right-wing one...
متن کاملTrade Agreements under Political Pressures
We study in this paper the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation, when the objective of each government is politically motivated. We explore a three-country and three-good trade model with endogenous tariffs and export subsidies in a political economy framework. In this context, we suggest that the welfare effects of both bilater...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Integration
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1225-651X,1976-5525
DOI: 10.11130/jei.2008.23.2.237